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agement with a weapon to defeat tender offers.84 A practical appraisal
of the situation presented to the court is necessary for effective
decision-making with regard to tender offers. The standards em-
ployed by the courts should be made more uniform; however, the
results which flow from the facts presented are of primary import-
ance. The courts thus far have reached compatible results and per-
haps this pattern will continue. With subsequent litigation in this
area, the standards for relief as well as the results will become homo-
geneous, to the ultimate benefit of target company shareholders.
JEFFREY W. MORRIS
III. SECTION 16 (b)
Section 16(b)I of the Securities Exchange Act of 19342 was enacted
to prevent corporate officers and directors and beneficial owners of
more than ten percent of a corporation's equity securities from profit-
ably misusing inside information in short swing transactions. 3 It pro-
vides for recovery by the corporation of insider profits realized on a
purchase-sale transaction, or sale-purchase transaction, of the corpo-
ration's securities when both ends of the transaction occur within six
months.' Although presumptions that an insider has access to inside
11 H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1968), reprinted at 1968 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 2813.
15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970).
2 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78a-78kk (Supp. Aug. 1975), amending 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78hh
(1970).
Prior to the enactment of the 1934 Act, insider trading, through participation in
stock pools, was widespread. The large profits which insiders were able to realize
because of their access to inside information were considered part of the normal com-
pensation for their offices. Section 16 was enacted to prevent such inside trading by
requiring statutory insiders to report their holdings in their corporation's securities, 15
U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1970), by providing for recovery of any profits received by an insider
in a short swing transaction, id. § 78p(b), and by absolutely prohibiting certain insider
transactions, id. § 78p(c). See S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong. 2d Sess. 55-68 (1934); Cook
& Feldman, Insider Trading Under the Securities Exchange Act, 66 HARv. L. REv. 385,
386-87, 408-10 (1953); Hecker, Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act: An Analy-
sis of the Time When Insider Status is Required, 24 KAN. L. REV. 255, 260-69 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Hecker].
I Section 16(b) provides that the corporation, or one of its shareholders, may sue
any statutory insider, officer, director, or beneficial owner of more than ten percent of
a class of the corporation's equity securities, for any profits realized on any pair of
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information5 and that he has misused this information if he conducts
a profitable short swing transaction' seem to indicate the corporation
should recover short swing profits in all instances of insider trading,7
the section's application is not always automatic.' Before applying §
16(b), the courts must determine which transactions include both a
§ 16(b) purchase and sale and whether the presumptions of access to
inside information and concurrent misuse are conclusive in all cases.
If § 16(b) does apply to a transaction, the courts must then determine
the amount of profits recoverable by the wronged corporation and the
manner by which the insider is to pay them.
A. Initial Purchase Creating Ten Percent Ownership
Although a director or officer need not have been an insider at
both the time of purchase and the time of sale,9 the exemptive
provision of § 16(b) requires that a ten percent beneficial owner be
so at both the time of purchase and sale to be liable for profits real-
purchasing and selling transactions in the corporation's securities within a six month
period. Shares acquired in connection with a previously contracted debt are exempt
from the section. The section does require, however, that the ten percent owner be such
at both the purchasing and selling transactions. No similar requirement applies to an
officer or director. Note that § 16(b) purchasing and selling transactions may be in any
order. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970).
3 Provident Sec. Co. v. Foremost-McKesson, Inc., 506 F.2d 601 (9th Cir. 1974),
aff'd 96 S. Ct. 508 (1976); 2 L. Loss, SEcURiTIES REGULATIONS 1040-42 (2d Ed. 1961).
[Hereinafter cited as Loss].
Provident Sec. Co. v. Foremost-McKesson, Inc., 506 F.2d 601 (9th Cir. 1974); 2
Loss, supra note 5, 1040-42.
7 Until recently, § 16(b) was applied automatically, and those insiders who con-
ducted a profitable short swing transaction were held strictly liable for these profits.
Reliance Elec. Co. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 404 U.S. 418, 422-23 (1972); Park & Tilford,
Inc. v. Schulte, 160 F.2d 984 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 761 (1947); Smolowe v.
Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943). The rationale
for such an objective application of § 16(b) was that it would be impossible to prove
an insider's intent in entering into a transaction or his abuse of information. See
Hearings on S. Res. 84, S. Res. 56, and S. Res. 97Before the Senate Comm. on Banking
& Currency, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 15, at 6557 (1934). See generally 2 Loss, supra
note 5, at 1040-44.
s The Supreme Court has approved a subjective, or pragmatic, approach in apply-
ing § 16(b) if the challenged transaction is unorthodox. See Kern County Land Co. v.
Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582 (1973) and text accompanying notes 46-68
infra.
9 Kramer v. Ayer, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 95,483 at 99,439 n.6 and 99,441
(S.D.N.Y. 1976); Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp., 406 F.2d 260 (2d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 1036 (1970); Adler v. Klawans, 267 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1959); Marquette
Cement Mfg. Co. v. Andreas, 239 F. Supp. 962 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
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ized in a short swing transaction.'" However, interpretation of the
exemptive provision's language "at the time of' has presented prob-
lems." In construing this language, the courts originally adopted a
,o This provision provides:
This subsection shall not be construed to cover any transaction where
such beneficial owner was not such both at the time of the purchase
and sale, or sale and purchase, of the security involved ....
15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970).
" See Hecker, supra note 3; Comment, Section 16(b) Liability and the Require-
ment That a 10 Percent Holder Be Such Both at the Time of Purchase and Time of
Sale, 27 ALA. L. REV. 211 (1975); Note, Ten Percent Stock Ownership-Prerequisite
to Section 16(b) Short-Swing Liability, 16 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 838 (1975); Note,
Involuntariness and Other Contemporary Problems Under Section 16(b) of the Securi-
ties and Exchange Act of 1934, 27 HAST. L.J. 679, 694-703 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
Note, 27 HAST. L. J. 679]; Comment, Is the Purchase By Which One Becomes a
Ten Percent Beneficial Owner a Statutory Purchase Within the Meaning of Section
16(b)-?, 7 RUT.-CAMDEN L. J. 104 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Comment, 7 RuT.-
CAMDEN L. J. 104 (1915)]; Note; Section 16(b)-Ten Percent Beneficial Ownership
Must Exist Prior to Both a Purchase and Sale for Liability to Attach, 53 TEXAS L. REV.
857 (1975).
Another problem with which the courts have dealt in § 16(b) litigation is that of
determining when one spouse is the beneficial owner of the other's securities. In Whit-
ing v. Dow Chemical Co., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 95,294 (2d Cir. 1975), the Second
Circuit was presented with the issue whether the purchase of a corporation's securities
by a director could be matched with the sale of the corporation's securities by the
director's spouse. In deciding the issue, the court noted that the director received
benefits from his spouse's stock holdings substantially equivalent to ownership, id. at
98,504 (spouse's dividend income paid the children's education, family's medical ex-
penses, property taxes, and maintenance expenses of a vacation home), and that the
spouse's stock transactions together with his own were part of a common, joint invest-
ment plan. Id. Thus, the court concluded that the director was the beneficial owner of
his spouse's securities and matched the director's purchase with his spouse's sale. See
SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7793 (Jan. 19, 1966); Shreve, Beneficial
Ownership of Securities Held by Family Members, 22 Bus. LAW. 431 (1967). The lower
court's opinion is discussed in 1974 Security Law Developments, 32 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 721, 801-02 (1975).
Another recent case, Altamil Corp. v. Pryor, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 95,487 (S.D.
Ind. 1975), considered the related issue whether a director would be liable under §
16(b) for short swing transactions in his corporation's securities by his wife. In holding
the director liable, the court noted "that the defendant exercised complete control over
the purchase and sale of . . . stock . . . in the name of [his wife]." Id. at 99,456.
Additionally, the defendant benefitted from his wife's stock transactions to the extent
that profits realized by his wife would reduce the need for him to transfer assets to
the wife's estate. Id. at 99,457. The facts of this case are within the purview of a
statement in Whiting, which provides:
[clases where the husband simply buys stock and puts the shares in
his wife's name are relatively simple; so too, ... where he has sole
control of her account.
Id. at 98,506. Together, Whiting and Pryor indicate that beneficial ownership of one
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"simultaneous with" construction, thus holding that a purchase
which created ten percent beneficial ownership was a § 16(b) pur-
chase.2 More recently, however, the courts have espoused a "prior to"
construction, which requires that insider status exist before a pur-
chase if that purchase is to be deemed part of a § 16(b) transaction. 3
The difference between these two interpretations lies in the type
of abuse by ten percent owners which § 16(b) was intended to pro-
hibit. A short swing transaction may be based on double transaction
abuse or single transaction abuse. Double transaction abuse exists
when both the purchasing transaction and selling transaction are
based on inside information. 5 Thus, to constitute double transaction
abuse, insider status must exist prior to the initial transaction. Single
transaction abuse exists when only the closing transaction is based
on inside information obtained subsequent to the initial transaction.
The first case to interpret the section's exemptive provision, Stella
v. Graham-Paige Motors Corp.,"T ruled that single transaction abuse
was sufficient to hold a ten percent beneficial owner liable under §
16(b). Thus, the purchase which gave the owner more than ten per-
cent of the corporation's shares could be matched with a sale of these
shares less than six months later to give rise to § 16(b) liability. 8
Though the court recognized that this initial purchase could not have
been motivated by an intent to speculate on the basis of inside infor-
mation, it concluded that this "simultaneous with" construction of
the exemptive provision was necessary to prevent speculative abuse
spouse's securities by the other will result when one receives benefits from the other's
holdings substantially equivalent to ownership or when one substantially controls the
other's transactions.
1" Stella v. Graham-Paige Motors Corp., 104 F. Supp. 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1952),
remanded, 232 F.2d 299 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 831 (1956). This decision was
followed by a majority of courts until recently. See, e.g., Emerson Elec. Co. v. Reliance
Elec. Co., 434 F.2d 918 (8th Cir. 1970), afi'd on other grounds, 404 U.S. 418 (1972),
Newmark v. RKO General, Inc., 425 F.2d 348 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 854
(1970).
'1 Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Gulf & Western Industries, Inc., 527 F.2d 335 (7th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 865 (1976); Provident Sec. Co. v. Foremost-
McKesson, Inc., 506 F.2d 601 (9th Cir. 1974). Until these two holdings, the only case
ruling against Stella was Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. W. R. Stephens Investment
Co., 141 F. Supp. 841, 847 (W. D. Ark. 1956). See also Stella v. Graham-Paige Motors
Corp., 232 F.2d 299, 302 (Hincks, J., dissenting).
11 See Hecker, supra note 3, at 259-60; Note, 27 HAsT. L. J. 679, supra note 11, at
696-97.
11 Hecker, supra note 3, at 259.
Id.
'7 104 F. Supp. 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
18 232 F.2d 299 (2d Cir. 1956).
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of inside information at the time of the sale."5 The court rejected the
"prior to" construction because such an interpretation would immu-
nize from § 16(b) sale-repurchase sequences subsequent to the
original purchase." In Provident Securities Co. v. Foremost-Mc-
Kessen, Inc.' and in Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co. v. Gulf &
Western Industries, Inc.," the Ninth and Seventh Circuits refused to
follow the Stella interpretation of § 16(b)'s exemptive provision.
Rather, these circuits adopted a "prior to" construction based on the
conclusion that the section was intended to prevent a ten percent
owner from speculating on the basis of double transaction abuse only.
Recently, the Supreme Court adopted this interpretation when it
affirmed the Provident decision. 3
In Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Provident Securities Co., the
Supreme Court relied on the legislative history and the exemptive
provision of § 16(b) in ruling that a ten percent owner's short swing
purchase and sale is subject to § 16(b) liability only if he was a
beneficial owner of the securities before the purchase. 4 The Court
noted that the original version of the section25 contemplated insider
1, Id. at 959-60.
20 Id. at 959. Thus, although the court's holding prevents single transaction abuse,
its major concern was how to prevent double transaction abuse in a subsequent sale-
repurchase sequence. See Hecker, supra note 3, at 270.
21 506 F.2d 601 (9th Cir. 1974). In Provident, Provident Securities Co., wishing to
liquidate, agreed to sell its assets to Foremost-McKesson in exchange for Foremost
debentures and cash. Since these debentures were immediately convertible into more
than ten percent of Foremost common stock, Provident became a ten percent owner
and § 16(b) insider of Foremost at the time of this transaction. Six days later, Provi-
dent agreed to sell half these debentures to an underwriter at a profit.
22 527 F.2d 335 (7th Cir. 1975). In Allis-Chalmers, Gulf & Western purchased more
than ten percent of Allis-Chalmers' stock. A month later it made a second purchase
of Allis-Chalmers' stock. Two months subsequent, Gulf & Western agreed to sell all
its Allis-Chalmers stock at a profit. The court held that only the second, not the initial,
purchase was a § 16(b) transaction. Id. at 338-40.
23 96 S. Ct. 508 (1976).
24 Id. at 516-22.
25 The original version of the 1934 Act was S. 2693, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).
Section 15(b)(1) of that Act provided:
It shall be unlawful for any director, officer, or owner of securities,
owning as of record and/or beneficially more than 5 per centum of any
class of stock of any issuer, any security of which is registered on a
national securities exchange-
(1) To purchase any such registered security with the intention
or expectation of selling the same security within six months; and any
profit made by such person on any transaction in such a registered
security extending over a period of less than six months shall inure to
and be recoverable by the issuer, irrespective of any intention or ex-
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status prior to a purchase-sale transaction. Its purpose was to prevent
insiders, with their inside information, from getting in and out of
stock within six months.2 This original section, which did not distin-
guish between directors and officers and beneficial owners, was
changed to impose liability in both purchase-sale and sale-purchase
sequences without requiring insider status prior to the initial transac-
tion. 27 However, the exemptive provision was added and distin-
guished beneficial owners from other insiders.3 The Court reasoned
that the purpose of the exemptive provison was to preserve the re-
quirement of insider status before the initial transaction when deal-
ing with ten percent owners.29 Thus, the Court concluded that a




The Court, however, did not decide whether this interpretation
would immunize a sale-repurchase transaction subsequent to the ini-
tial purchase3 1-a major concern which caused the Stella court to
reject the "prior to" analysis in favor of the "simultaneous with"
construction.3 2 The Stella Court was concerned because an individual
could purchase more than ten percent of a corporation's stock, obtain
inside information because of his newly acquired insider status, and
then based on this inside information reduce his stockholding to
below ten percent and repurchase the stock to above ten percent at a
profit. Because immediately prior to this repurchase the individual
was not a ten percent owner, this would not be a §16(b) purchase. The
Court discounted the need for such concern today because § 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5 33 would remedy any actual misuse of inside informa-
pectation on his part in entering into such transaction of holding the
security purchased for a period exceeding six months.
2 Hearings on H. R. 7852 and H. R. 8720 Before the House Comm. on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 133 (1934); See Hecker, supra note 3, at
261-69.
See § 16(b) as enacted, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970). Although the original version
dealt only with purchase-sale transactions, the act was amended to include sale-
purchase transactions because inside information as to bad financial condition of a
corporation could be taken advantage of as well as good information. See Hearings on
S. Res. 84, S. Res. 56, and S. Res. 97 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and
Currency, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. pt. 15 at 6557-58 (1934).
21 The exemptive provision by its terms applies only to beneficial owners. See 15
U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970).
22 96 S. Ct. at 516-17.
' Id.
' The Court stated it would express no view on this issue. Id. at 515 n.15.
32 Stella v. Graham-Paige Motors Corp., 104 F. Supp. 957, 959 (1952).
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1975); See Comment, 7 RUT.-
CAMDEN L. J. 104, supra note 11 at 121-23.
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tion in such a transaction. Additionally, the Court cited the Ninth
Circuit's opinion in Provident" which held that a "prior to" construc-
tion in a purchase-sale sequence did not foreclose a "simultaneous
with" interpretation in a sale-repurchase transaction.35 Although the
Ninth Circuit recognized that such a conclusion did not "provide a
consistent construction of the language 'at the time' for both initial
and the closing transactions," it reasoned that such construction was
nevertheless "consistent with the rationale of section 16(b)-a con-
sistency . . . more important than the consistency of terms."36 The
Seventh Circuit, however, disagreed that such a dual construction
was compatible with Congress' intent. In Allis-Chalmers Manufac-
turing Co. v. Gulf & Western Industries, Inc.,3' decided shortly before
the Supreme Court's Provident decision, it adopted an analysis of §
16(b) which precluded the need for a dual construction of the exemp-
tive provision in subjecting a sale-repurchase sequence to § 16(b)
liability.
In Allis-Chalmers, the Seventh Circuit also held that an initial
purchase creating beneficial ownership was not a § 16(b) purchase.
However, the court did not rely on the exemptive provision, but
rather concluded that § 16(b) contemplated insider status prior to
any short swing transaction.38 The court reasoned that the legislative
history of the section indicated that Congress intended to treat a sale
and purchase or purchase and sale as a single, conceptual unit, and
that it did not intend § 16(b) to apply to each separate part of a
transaction. 9 The focus of the section was to be on insider status
before entering into the two-part transaction. Thus, an initial pur-
chase creating beneficial ownership and a subsequent sale could not
be a § 16(b) transaction. However, since beneficial ownership existed
prior to entering into the two-part transaction, a sale and repurchase
transaction within six months would be a § 16(b) transaction. The
Allis-Chalmers decision, however, ignores the distinction which the
exemptive provision draws between beneficial owners and directors
and officers. Under the court's holding, the beginning purchases or
sales in short swing transactions by directors and officers prior to
their gaining insider status would not be § 16(b) purchases. However,
1, 96 S. Ct. at 515.
506 F.2d 601, 614-15 (9th Cir. 1974).
38 Id. at 614.
527 F.2d 335 (7th Cir. 1975).
Id. at 346-49. The court's analysis included a requirement of insider status prior
to a transaction for officers and directors as well as for beneficial owners.
31 Id. at 346-47.
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other cases dealing with such situations have held the director or
officer liable under § 16(b).40
The reason for this is that § 16(b) was intended to prevent both
double and single transaction abuse when dealing with directors and
officers but only double transaction abuse when dealing with benefi-
cial owners. The rationale for this distinction is that directors and
officers are considered to have more ready access to corporate inside
information and to have greater influence over corporate decisions
affecting stock values than ten percent stockholders.4'
The Seventh Circuit's statutory construction of the exemptive
provision raises additional problems. The court concluded that the
exemptive provision required a finding of insider status only prior to
the initial transaction and did not require a finding of insider status
at the time of the closing transaction. It reasoned that the language
"both at the time of purchase and sale, or sale and purchase ... "
should be construed as referring to the two types of transactions and
not as referring to the separate components of the two types of trans-
actions.42 Such a construction, however, renders the exemptive provi-
sion surplusage-the language of the section already reaches both
types of transactions. 3 Moreover, the legislative history of § 16(b)
indicates that the language "purchase and sale, or sale and purchase"
refers to one type transaction, a short swing transaction, that can be
accomplished in two ways.44 Finally, the court's conclusion that the
exemptive provision does not require insider status at both the pur-
chase and sale ends of a transaction is at odds with the Supreme
40 Kramer v. Ayer, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 95,483 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Feder v.
Martin Marietta Corp., 406 F.2d 260 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1036 (1970);
Adler v. Klawans, 267 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1959); Marquette Cement Mfg. Co. v. Andreas,
239 F. Supp. 962 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
1' See Adler v. Klawans, 267 F.2d 840, 845 (1959). Cf. Foremost-McKesson, Inc.
v. Provident Sec. Co., 96 S. Ct. 508, 520-21 (1976).
42 527 F.2d at 346-49.
See 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970), which provides in the first sentence, that all
insiders must return,
"any profit realized by him from any purchase and sale, or any sale
and purchase .... "
In its original version, see note 24 supra, § 16(b) prohibited use of inside infor-
mation only in purchase-sale transactions. Because sale-purchase transactions were
equally subject to speculative abuse, the phrase was added. See Hearings on H. R. 7852
and H. R. 8720 Before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. 133 (1934). By including sale-purchase transactions within the purview
of § 16(b), the drafters were not changing the thrust of the statute, but merely indicat-
ing two ways to complete a short swing transaction.
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Court's holding in Reliance Electric Co. v. Emerson Electric Co.45
There, the Court held that the exemptive provision immunized a
second sale from § 16(b) when a prior sale brought the seller's holding
to below ten percent. The second sale was not considered a § 16(b)
sale because at that time the seller was not a ten percent owner."
Thus, the question remains whether the dual construction of the
provision's language "at the time of' as espoused by the Ninth Cir-
cuit in Provident to reach sale-repurchase sequences is permissable
under § 16(b). However, though it did not address this issue directly,
the Supreme Court's holding in Provident as to the types of abuse
which the section prohibits supports the Ninth Circuit's dual con-
struction. The Supreme Court's construction of the language "at the
time of" to mean "prior to" was the result of its conclusion that
beneficial owners were to be liable under § 16(b) only for those trans-
actions in which there was double transaction abuse. 7 This interpre-
tation was not the result of a technical reading of the statute based
on syntax or grammer, but was the means by which to implement
congressional intent. Since a sale-repurchase sequence by a beneficial
owner involves double transaction abuse, the question becomes how
to interpret the provision to prevent such abuse. A "simultaneous
with" construction referring to the repurchase implements
congressional intent, just as a "prior to" construction referring to the
initial purchase implements congressional intent. However, even if
such a sale-repurchase transaction would not be within the purview
of § 16(b), investors are protected from actual abuse by § 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5. In noting the existence of these alternative means of
remedying abuse in a sale-repurchase transaction, the Court made
clear that an individual who completes a short swing sale-repurchase
transaction based on inside information will be subject to liability.
45 404 U.S. 418 (1972). The court's analysis is also at odds with the Supreme
Court's analysis in Provident. Though the Supreme Court in Provident did not give
an opinion regarding the Allis-Chalmers decision, 96 S. Ct. at 515 n.16 and 519 n.25,
it did state that the purpose of the exemptive provision was to draw a distinction
between beneficial owners and directors and officers. Id. at 516-17. Under the Allis-
Chalmers decision, all insiders would be treated equally. Furthermore, a footnote in
the Court's opinion indicates that it viewed the exemptive provision as referring to
both components of a transaction. In discussing its holding in Reliance Electric, the
Court noted that it had before it only the issue of construction of "at the time of
purchase." Id. at 519 n.25. This seems to rebut the Seventh Circuit's conclusion that
the exemptive provision does not require a "both ends" test of insider status.
404 U.S. at 422-27.
" See text accompanying notes 14-15 supra; notes 24-30 supra.
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However, since this case was not presented, the Court declined to rule
whether such a transaction would be subject to § 16(b) or § 10(b). 5
B. Pragmatic Approach
On its face, § 16(b) requires automatic application when an insi-
der completes a profitable short swing transaction.49 In Kern County
Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Co.,5" however, the Supreme Court
distinguished between orthodox and unorthodox transactions.5'
When confronted with the latter-type transaction, the Court ap-
proved a subjective, or pragmatic, approach to determine if an insider
would be liable under § 16(b).52 This approach entailed a two part test
which had to be satisfied before liability would attach. First, did the
insider have access to inside information? Second, if so, did he have
sufficient control over the transaction to enable him to misuse this
information? Before applying the Kern test, however, the courts
must determine which transactions are unorthodox. Although the
Supreme Court indicated the form of an unorthodox transaction,54 it
did not clearly set forth any standard to determine when the sub-
stance of the transaction is unorthodox."5 Recent cases reveal that
' See Hecker, supra note 3, at 270.
' Originally, the courts construed § 16(b) liability to vest on an objective measure
of proof. Whenever an insider completed a profitable short swing transaction, § 16(b)
liability attached, and no inquiry into actual misuse of inside information was neces-
sary. See Park & Tilford, Inc. v. Schulte, 160 F.2d 984 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S.
761 (1947); Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S.
751 (1943). For a history of the objective approach, see Blair v. Lamb, 363 F.2d 507,
518-19 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1002 (1967).
411 U.S. 582 (1973).
51 The Court defined orthodox transactions as "traditional cash-for-stock transac-
tions" and unorthodox transactions as "stock conversions, exchanges pursuant to
mergers and other corporate reorganizations, stock reclassifications, and dealings in
options, rights, and warrants." Id. at 593 n.24.
52 For discussions concerning the evolution and application of the pragmatic ap-
proach, see Hazen; The New Pragmatism Under Section 16(b) of the Securities Ex-
change Act, 54 N.C. L. REv. 1 (1975); McElroy, Pragmatic Disgorging of Insider Prof-
its: A Review of Cases Reported Under Section 16(b), 7 ST. MARY's L. J. 473 (1975);
Wentz, Refining a Crude Role: The Pragmatic Approach to Section 16(b) of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934, 70 Nw. U. L. Rv. 221 (1975). Note, Section 16(b) Liability
for Profits Realized From a Cash Purchase and Sale Within Six Months of Two Issuers
Involved in an Intervening Reorganization, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 1323, 1323-39 (1975);
Note, Involuntariness and Other Contemporary Problems Under Section 16(b) of the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 27 HAST. L. J. 679, 679-94 (1976).
411 U.S. at 596-601.
51 See note 48 supra, identifying the types of transactions considered unorthodox.
55 The Court merely stated that in determining which transactions are within the
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involuntariness of a transaction is an important factor in deciding
whether a transaction is unorthodox.
In Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co. v. Gulf & Western Indus-
tries, Inc.," Gulf & Western made two purchases and one sale of Allis-
Chalmers stock within six months. The initial purchase was by
tender offer and created ten percent beneficial ownership. 57 The sec-
ond purchase involved a sale by Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. of its Allis-
Chalmers stock holdings to Gulf & Western for 496,000 Gulf & West-
ern stock warrants. 8 Gulf & Western successfully argued that the
initial purchase was not a § 16(b) purchase. 9 However, the court
rejected the argument that § 16(b) should not be automatically ap-
plied to the second purchase. Although the consideration involved
was not cash, the court noted that this alone was insufficient to
characterize the nature of the transaction as unorthodox."0 Gulf &
Western was not forced into an unwanted position with respect to the
Allis-Chalmers stock purchase. Rather, it had voluntarily initiated
the negotiations with Oppenheimer and had merely suggested that
warrants, instead of cash, be used as consideration."1 Furthermore,
even had the court concluded that the second purchase was an unor-
thodox transaction, Gulf & Western would not have satisfied the
purview of § 16(b), a court should inquire whether the transaction "may serve as a
vehicle for the evil which Congress sought to prevent-the realization of short swing
profits based upon access to inside information . 411 U.S. at 594.
56 527 F.2d 335 (7th Cir. 1975).
51 Id. at 338-39.
58 Oppenheimer sold 248,000 shares of Allis-Chalmers stock to Gulf & Western.
Id. The sale by Gulf & Western was the result of other negotiations it had been
conducting with White Consolidated Industries, Inc.; White agreed to purchase
3,248,000 shares of Allis-Chalmers stock from Gulf & Western for 250,000 shares of
unregistered White common stock, $20 million, and a three month, 8 1/2% promissory
note for $93,680,000. Id. at 340.
s' See text accompanying notes, 21-45 supra.
60 527 F.2d at 351. See also, Provident Securities Co. v. Foremost-McKesson, Inc.,
506 F.2d 601, 604-05 (9th Cir. 1974), where the Ninth Circuit held that a transaction
was not unorthodox merely because cash was not the consideration for the stock; 2
Loss, supra note 3, at 1072.
60 527 F.2d at 351. The Supreme Court's opinion in Kern also supports the Seventh
Circuit's holding that the voluntariness of a transaction is determinative of its ortho-
dox characterization. See Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Co., 411
U.S. 582, 600 (1973), where the Court stated:
"We do not suggest that an exchange of stock pursuant to a merger
may never result in § 16(b) liability. But the involuntary nature of
Occidental's exchange, when coupled with the absence of the possibil-
ity of speculative abuse of inside information, convinces us that §
16(b) should not apply ....
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Kern test. Gulf & Western had been in close contact with the officers
and directors of Allis-Chalmers during the entire negotiation period,
thus having access to inside information. Finally, the disposition of
its holdings was subsequent to its receipt of inside information from
Allis-Chalmers, thus creating a possibility of abuse.2
In another recent case, the court held that the Kern pragmatic
approach did apply based on a determination that the acquisition
was involuntary. In Morales v. Mapco, Inc.," Ross, the financial vice-
president of Mapco, purchased 3616 Mapco common stock warrants.
More than six months subsequent to his last purchase, Ross exercised
these warrants and then almost simultaneously sold the shares he
had received. 4 The court noted that the exercise of the warrants was
not a "traditional 'cash-for-stock' purchase" and that this was an
involuntary conversion to the extent that Ross would have suffered a
significant loss had he not converted. 5 Thus, the court concluded
that the transactions were unorthodox and held that under Kern
neither the acquisition nor the sale of the shares were transactions to
which § 16(b) applied. Since the value of the warrants and the value
of the stock were economic equivalents-the conversion did not
change Ross's proportioned equity ownership-he could not have
benefited from the misuse of any inside information in this acquisi-
tion. 6 Furthermore, since the stock was sold immediately after con-
version, the "simultaneous nature of the exchange" made it impossi-
ble for Ross to base the sale on inside information. 7
In noting the impossibility for misuse of inside information, the
Mapco court omitted the first part of the Kern test by not inquiring
into Ross' actual access to inside information. However, the court's
62 527 F.2d at 351.
3 [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 95,094 (N.D. Okl. 1975).
" From March, 1964, to June, 1971, Ross purchased the warrants. The warrants
were automatically converted into one-half share of Mapco common stock on April 1,
1972. Alternatively, a warrant plus $9.00 could be converted into one share prior to
April 1, 1972. Ross exercised all his warrants under the alternative conversion plan.
However, he did not sell all the stock he received upon conversion. He sold only 900
shares. Id. at 97,876-77.
,5 Id. at 97,879. Involuntariness has been defined as the absence of any other
"realistic alternative" to the completed transaction. A cash-for-stock transaction
which would subject an individual to automatic § 16(b) liability is not a "realistic
alternative." See Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Co., 411 U.S. 582,
600 (1973).
a [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. RP. 95,094, at 97,878-79; See
Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 F.2d 342, 345-46 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 927
(1959).
67 [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. RP. 95,094, at 97,879.
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apparent presumptions that he did seems proper. The presumption
of an insider's access to inside information is based partly on the
corporate realities that officers, directors, and ten percent equity
owners are in a position to know, participate in, and influence the
important decisions of a corporation." In Kern, the Supreme Court
recognized that not all ten percent owners may be in such a position.
For example, a ten percent owner in a hostile relationship with major-
ity shareholders will not have access to inside information.70 However,
there is no reason to rebut the presumption that officers and directors
have access to inside information because the nature of their job
requires knowledge of and participation in corporate decisions. The
existence of the exemptive provision supports this distinction be-
tween the directors' and officers' relationship with the issuer and the
ten percent owners' relationship with the issuer. Indeed, courts have
recognized that officers and directors are more knowledgeable of and
have more influence over corporate decisions than do ten percent
owners by the very nature of their relation to the corporation.
7'
Together the Mapco and Allis-Chalmers decisions indicate that
the mere form of a transaction will not render it unorthodox. An
important consideration under Kern is whether the challenged trans-
action was entered into voluntarily. Because § 16(b) cannot deter
involuntary transactions, to impose liability automatically in such
situations will not further the section's purpose. Furthermore, the
pragmatic approach resulted from criticism of the harshness resulting
from automatic application of § 16(b). Since application of the
section seems the harshest when an individual can not help but sat-
isfy the objective criterion of the section, a subjective determination
whether he misused inside information in such situations is fair.
C. Section 16(b) Profits
In order "to squeeze all possible profits out of [§ 16(b)] transac-
tions, 7 2 the amount of profits recoverable by a corporation in a §
11 The court stated that to have held Ross subject to § 16(b) "would penalize a
holder of securities for following sound economic principles merely because he serves
the corporation in an official capacity, and thereby has access to inside information."
Id.
69 See S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 55-68 (1934); Hearings on S. Res. 84,
S. Res. 56, and S. Res. 97 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 15, at 6555 and pt. 16, at 7741-42 (1934). Cf. Foremost-McKesson,
Inc. v. Provident Securities Corp., 96 S. Ct. 508 (1976).
70 Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582, 598 (1973).
71 Adler v. Klawans, 267 F.2d 840, 845 (2d Cir. 1959).
72 Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 239 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 320
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16(b) action is calculated on the lowest price in, highest price out
basis.71 Such a high standard deters insiders from furthering their
own self interest at the expense of the fiduciary duty they owe their
corporation and precludes the possibility of abuse that is inherent in
alternative methods of profit computation. 74 Recently, a New York
District Court utilized this rationale in determining how § 16(b) prof-
its are to be paid.
In Lewis v. Arcara,7 5 defendant Arcara, a vice-president of Capital
Cities Communication, Inc., realized a profit on a short-swing pur-
chase and sale of Capital Cities stock. He did not contest that the
profit was recoverable, and he and Capital Cities reached an out-of-
court settlement whereby Capital Cities accepted a five-year,
interest-bearing note as payment for the profits.76 The court, however,
ruled that the purposes of the section required that profits be imme-
diately disgorged. 77 Although in this case Arcara and Capital Cities
U.S. 751 (1944); 2 Loss, supra note 3, at 1062-63.
" Id. Under this rule, profits are calculated in the following fashion:
Listed in one column are all the purchases made during the period for
which recovery of profits is sought. In another column is listed all of
the sales during that period. Then the shares purchased at the lowest
price are matched against an equal number of the shares sold at the
highest price within six months of such purchase, and the profit com-
puted. After that the next lowest price is matched against the next
highest price and that profit is computed. Then, the same process is
repeated until all the shares in the purchase column. . . have been
matched [against shares sold for higher prices in the sales column].
Feldman and Rubin, Statutory Inhibitions Upon Unfair Use of Corporate Information
by Insiders, 95 U. PA. L. Rv. 468, 482 (1947).
11 136 F.2d at 239. Alternative methods of profit computation include a first-in,
first-out rule (FIFO) and a rule whereby the courts average the purchase and sale
prices of the stock traded during a six-month period. Under FIFO, an individual could
evade § 16(b) liability by maintaining a large inventory of the shares at all times.
Under the averaging rule, an individual who purchased stock at a high price could,
after the price fell, within six months purchase more at a low price based on inside
information that the price was going to rise. The individual could thus recoup any
losses by selling after the price rise and incur no § 16(b) liability. Such a scheme would
work because an insider could buy 5,000 shares at 100 and purchase another 5,000
shares when the market fell to 70 (four months later) on inside information of a future
price rise and sell when the price rises to 80 (within one month of second purchase,
five of first) incurring no § 16(b) liability because his average cost was 85. See 2 Loss,
supra note 3, at 1062 n.114.
11 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. T 95,238 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
71 Id. at 98,251.
77 The court noted that in order to insure a deterrent effect the section was in-
tended to prevent even the possibility for abuse in insider trading. By its terms, § 16(b)
requires return of profits regardless of motive or actuality of abuse. If good faith has
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had acted in good faith, allowance of deferred payment schemes
under § 16(b) "would open the door to potential abuses."78 Since a
corporation acts through its insiders, to permit such a method of
returning § 16(b) profits would only encourage insiders to deal
amongst themselves in order to accommodate to the insider the least
burdensome means of payment." Furthermore, a deferred payment
scheme would soften the impact of § 16(b) in requiring full payment
of profits to the corporation and, therefore, decrease the deterrent
effect of the statute.
In calculating the profits to be returned, courts are often faced
with problems of valuing property other than cash that is used as
consideration to pay for securities in a § 16(b) transaction. Usually,
the valuation is based on expert opinion as to the fair market value
of the property at the time of the transaction.8" However, problems
arise in deciding what the experts should consider. In Allis-Chalmers
Manufacturing Co. v. Gulf & Western Industries, Inc. ,8 the Seventh
Circuit considered three means by which to value unregistered war-
rants and stock-the low price, the volume weighted average price,
or the high price for registered stocks and warrants on the days of the
§ 16(b) transaction.82 The plaintiff argued that § 16(b)'s policy to
recapture all possible profits from the transaction required the court
to value the warrants used to purchase the § 16(b) securities under
the low price figure and the stock received for selling the securities
under the high price figure. The Court disagreed and based its valua-
tion of both on their volume weighted average price.
83
nothing to do with determining § 16(b) liability, it shouldn't have anything to do with
paying the profits. Id. at 98,252-53. See also Schur v. Salzman, 365 F. Supp. 725
(S.D.N.Y. 1973), where it was held that if an insider withholds profits for a substantial
period of time by raising frivilous defenses, the insider must pay a penalty interest.
78 Id. at 98,252.
1, Id. See also, Lewis v. Wells, 325 F. Supp. 382 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), where it was held
that a § 16(b) profit settlement for less than full amount of profits was not permitted
under the section, regardless of any good faith.
1o E.g., Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Gulf & Western Industries, Inc., 527 F.2d 335,
352 n.17 (7th Cir. 1975); Kramer v. Ayer, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 95,483, at 99,442-
43 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
8' 527 F.2d 335 (7th Cir. 1975).
Low price means the lowest price paid for the security traded on the exchange
on a given day. High price means the highest price paid. Volume weighted average
price is determined by dividing the total amount paid for all the shares traded by the
number of shares traded. Id. at 352-53 n.19.
I Id. at 354. The court also held that evidence of full payment of a debt obligation
is conclusive as to its value. To have ruled otherwise and permitted a discounted
valuation to be used in computing profits after full payment would have enabled the
insider to retain for himself the amount of the discount, a realized profit. Id. at 356-
